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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RODNEY B. JENSEN

)

Defendant and Appellant, )
vs.

)

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent.)
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
RODNEY B. JENSEN
Appeal from the First Judicial District court of Box Elder County,
Honorable L. F. Gunnell, District Court Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant appeals from a Final conviction and Sentencing
rendered on the 9th day of April, 1990. This case was tried to a
jury in the District Court, in and for Box Elder County, State of
Utah on September 25, 1989, the Honorable F. L. Gunnell, Judge,
presiding.

Thp- n*=>.f«*r>Hant wa_« charged and convicted of possession

of a controlled substance, in violation of 58-37-8(2) (a) (i ) . U.CA.
(}z*B6)i

poK^KSion nf drug paraphernalia, in violation of 58-37a-

5-(b), and carrying a concealed weapon in
504(a), in an Information dated the

violation of 76-10-

March 1, 1989.

The Defendant, after a ninety-day evalual.lun at the Utah State
Prison, *mn sentenced to serve a term of 0 to 5 years at the Utah
State Prison for the possession of controlled snbst*nr*» nharg^? one
y«ar In t^p Bo* Elder County Jail for the carrying of a concealed
weapon charge; and six months in the Box Eld^r County .Tall for the
possession of firiiij jwr^ph^rnHlia charge, with all sentences to run

concurrently. In addition, Defendant was ordered to pay $2,000.00
in fines.
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment and Sentence of
the District Court in connection with the possession of controlled
substance charge and for a determination by this Court that the
Appellant

is entitled

to a Judgment of Acquittal.

In the

alternative, Appellant seeks an Order a remanding the matter for
a new trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Reference as to the Record on Appeal shall be made as follows:
Tr., Page Number of the Transcript; R., page number of the Court
file included in the record on appeal, and Exh., Trial Exhibit.
On December 22, 1988, the Defendant was arrested by Officer
Bill Beckman of the Tremonton, Utah, Police Department a Traffic
Control Patrol Officer. He said he was aware that there was an
outstanding Bench Warrant for Jensen from the Third Circuit Court
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and pulled him over.
Officer Beckman called his dispatch to verify whether the
warrant was still valid. Upon being advised that it was, he placed
Mr. Jensen under arrest and transported him to the Tremonton City
Police Department.

The Officer then conducted a searched of the

person, and discovered that Jensen had a pistol in a holster on his
right hip and that it was covered by the long green army coat he
wore.

A clip magazine and a box of ammunition were found in the

lower right pocket of the jacket.
During a further search of the jacket the Officer found or
felt something round. He didn't know what it was, but thought it
2

might be a another loaded cartridge that was just in a pocket. His
testimony was: "I opened the pocket, and pulled out a brown cotton
bag out of his pocket.
his first aid kit.

I asked him what it was and he says it was

I really didn't know what it was at the time.

I placed it on the desk behind me and continued searching and found
no other evidence.

I placed Mr. Jensen then at that time in

handcuffs."(Tr.18).
Officer Beckman then opened up the bag and found a mirror,
a brown vial with a white powdery substance in it and a razor blade
in a cardboard protector, and placed those items in an evidence
bag. He then advised the Defendant that he was going to be charged
with carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia and transported the
Defendant to the Box Elder County Jail.
At the Trial the State called Arthur Terkleson, a Weber State
College Crime Lab manager and criminalist as its expert witness.
Among his other duties he performed analysis and identified and
examined evidence for purposes of Court testimony (Tr. 63). On
December 23, 1988, he received from Officer Beckman a bag with a
small brown bottle in it, a metal tube and a mirror with a razor
blade (Tr. 64).
He took a very, very small amount and added sulfuric acid and
formalin, a test otherwise called the Marquis Test, and the brown
color is the reaction which he observed as testing positive for
amphetamines (Tr. 67). He then ran a gas chromatograph test, and

3

color is the reaction which he observed as testing positive for
amphetamines (Tr. 67). He then ran a gas chromatograph test, and
the samples tested positive for amphetamine

He tested both the

substance out of the tube and the substance out of the vial and
concluded that the residue from th*=> tub** ™*<^ Tt*ot'h»7«pb«&"'m'J ^-^

Mr*

?prkieBon te^tifi^n that the mirror, the bottle, the metal tube and
the razor blade are consistent with the illicit use of a drug,
either conaJne or ^-"b^phetaraine.

He did not calculate how much

of the substance was in the vial (Tr. 73).
He did not
substance, but

make a determination

as to the purity of the

he supposed that this ^ s ^ not one-hundred percent

pure- The results of the test h^ -conducted iust demonstrated the
presence of methamph^tajwirie.

Ba^ed on bis experience, ho would

v;,ak^ a tongh ^e.Liraate i:hat th*-* quantity in the vial was between 15
and 25 milligrams simply by looking nt It, (Tr.

75} •

H^ said that If ^oi»«one were to fill this bottle up and then
dump it out there would still be some white puwder residue th~L
would be in

the bottle.

But he felt chat because there was still

a small amount in the bottle that could be puu.! ^«I oul »•« would n.oL
i-hrtfrtcterize that as simply residue (Tr. 76),
Terkleson further testified thai n^fh^-fM^;^-.:^ |^ * chemical
compound and is s i^g^i^rA dvug, i>»ade by pharmaceutical companies
for medicinal purposes,

(Tr. 81).

Amphetamines

aie coriuuorily

prescribed for weight less purposes and the chemical essentially
operates as central nervous stimulant.

Such pharma^^ist ical would

also contain inert or. non-motive ingredients as part of the way
they are manufactured and packaged. The Federal Drua Administration
4
requires the percentage of active ingredients be disclosed.

powder than was present in the Defendant's bottle.

His estimate

of 15 to 25 milligrams of powder in the brown vial was "a
guesstimate"; he did not weigh it out.

He stated that his

analysis, for Court purposes, was simply to determine whether the
presence of a scheduled compound existed somewhere in the powder,
and that he was not asked to identify the weight of the particular
compound.

(Tr. 86).

The chemical tests he used

in the

laboratory

are very

sensitive tests and relatively small quantities of a compound would
show a positive result for the presence of that compound. The gas
chromatograph is quite sensitive. The Marquis test is a visible
test, so there must be at least enough to see (Tr. 89). He found
nothing on the mirror and said the mirror and the razor blade, in
and of themselves, probably would not be paraphernalia.
He took the position that if there was enough compound to see
it wiggle around, that it may be a little more than residue, which
is something that if it (the vial) is upside down or if one is
trying to pour it out, you could not do so.

If it adheres to the

side, that's residue, but if anything would come out, that's not
residue, but a sample.
The chemist stated that the amount of actual methamphetamine
in the sample was certainly less than 100% of 25 or 15 milligrams
and could be as low as 5 to 10 milligrams (Tr. 92). He indicated
that since he did not know the percentage, he therefore could not
form an opinion as to whether the very small quantity involved
could have a pharmacological effect on a human being (Tr. 98).
Mr. Terkleson stated on re-direct examination; "Again, I
believe it was the same question counsel asked 'is there enough in
5

the sample.7

Because I don't know the percent I can't say that.

If it's above 50 or 75% then I would say there, well I don't know.
I don't know if there is enough there or not." The Prosecutor then
stated "But all you can say with any certainty, and what you do say
with certainty is that there was in fact methamphetamine present."
And the chemist replied "Yes, that's correct." (Tr. 98).
Mr. Terkleson was asked on re-cross (Tr. 98) whether 5 or 10
milligrams would have any commercial value, since that was far
smaller than any useful amount.

He replied "I would suppose

somebody who's into drugs and uses drugs would not be very thrilled
at that amount.

I don't know how much money he would give for it.

But a person who is using drugs would either eat or sniff or inject
that into their system whether they would get high or not, I've
already said I wouldn't dare say." With such a small quantity, you
can't really form an opinion.

"Because I don't know the percent."

(Tr. 99).
Rodney Jensen testified that he was a 22 year old resident of
Tremonton, who had lived there pretty much all his life, and was
living at the family home on the date he was arrested.

He was

employed as a construction worker doing concrete and cement work.
He hunted and had used firearms since a young age and had taken
hunters safety courses. He felt he was knowledgeable with respect
to the handling and use of firearms and did not believe that his
gun was loaded.

He stated that at least five separate actions

would be needed to fire the weapon.

He thought that because the

weapon was in a holster that it was legal,

and said that he was

carrying it in a safe manner (Tr 108-110). He further said he had
planned to sell the gun that day.
6

Mr. Jensen further testified that he was unaware that he had
the illegal items on his person or in his possession. He said that
the jacket in which they were found was an old jacket. He had not
even checked his pockets and accordingly had no specific intentions
regarding the items which were the basis of the prosecution for
possession of controlled substance and paraphernalia. He testified
that he did not intend to commit the crimes that he was charged
with, he was unaware that those items were even on his person. (Tr.
).

On cross-examination the Defendant was asked if he knew what
was in the bag. He replied "I knew there was a mirror and a bottle
and a straw."
Q.

Did you know what was in the bottle?

A.

There wasn't anything in the bottle, I didn't think.

Q.

Why didn't you think there was anything in the bottle?

A.

Because it didn't look to me that there was.

The prosecution then stated "So when you say that you didn't
think there was any left in there what you are really saying is
that after you go through taking the rest of it you didn't think
there was much left, is that correct?"
The Defendant answered "I don't understand what you are saying
here." (Tr.

)

At the conclusion of the State's case the Defendant moved for
dismissal of the Possession of Controlled Substance count on the
ground that the quantity was insufficient to establish a Third
Degree Felony charge requiring that the defendant knowingly and
intentionally possessed a controlled substance.
The Motion was denied. (Tr.
7

)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

POINT I:
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
The Defendant submits that the evidence adduced at his trial
was insufficient to support his conviction for violation of Utah
Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1986), which states "it is unlawful for
any

person knowingly

and

intentionally

to possess

. . .

a

controlled substance". His position is that while the evidence may
support a charge of possession of drug paraphernalia contrary to
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 58-37a-4(5), and 58-37a-3(10), or
(12)(f), that the amount of methamphetamine found in the brown vial
and in the straw was, at most, residue sufficient to establish
those items as being paraphernalia.
chemical

tests

were

so minute

Since the amounts detected by

as

to

have

no

medicinal

or

pharmacological effect on a person, nor sufficient to have any
commercial

value

the

defendant

could

not

knowingly

and

intentionally possess a controlled substance.

POINT II:
THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT.
A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it (1) makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
8

severity of the crime.

A sentence may be excessive if it serves

no acceptable social purpose or is grossly disproportionate to the
seriousness of the crime. (R. 180-223).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF
POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
It is Defendant's contention that a reasonable interpretation
of the foregoing Statutes require that the State prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a Defendant exercise control over a drug with
knowledge of its presence and character, and that a particular
minimum quantity of methamphetamine is necessary to prove the
Defendant "knowingly and intentionally possessed" the drug, in
order to sustain a felony conviction. Defendant submits that this
Court should reconsider its recent decision in State v. Warner 129
Utah Adv. Rpt 21, 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah App. 1990), and its reliance
on State v. Winters 16 Utah 2.D 139, 396 P.2d 872 (Utah 1964) for
the proposition that "no particular quantity of narcotics is
necessary to sustain a conviction for possession of a narcotic
drug".
The evidence in this case was that the amount was so small
that the chemist was unable to say whether it would have an effect
on a person or not. The rule of Warner would permit any person to
be charged with the felony possession of a controlled substance
based solely on the finding of residue, a trace, or minute amount
which

would

be

susceptible

of
9

discovery

only

by

extremely

sophisticated tests.

The sensitivity of the chemistry equipment

utilized by the drug laboratories is sufficient to detect the
presence of very minute trace quantities of a drug.

The chemist

in this case estimated the active ingredient to be somewhere in the
5 to 10 milligram range. Jensen testified that he thought that the
bottle was empty.
sentencing

In light of the substantial disparity in

between

a

Class

"B"

misdemeanor

penalty

for

paraphernalia and 5 years in prison for possession of amphetamine,
the quantity involved becomes crucial.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Harbison v. Statef 302 Ark.
315 (1990) held that a Defendant who possessed a glass bottle that
contained only cocaine residue could not be convicted of possession
of cocaine.

The facts of Harbison are very similar to the facts

here and in the Warner case.

The Defendant was pulled over for a

traffic violation, leading to the serving of a warrant of arrest.
A subsequent search disclosed a brown bottle which gave rise to a
charge of possession.
The Arkansas statute states " . . .

it is unlawful for any

person to possess a controlled substance . . . "
that

"all violations

substance".

are based

Harbison argued

on weight of the controlled

The Arkansas Supreme Court perceived the case as

being squarely, and for the first time, asked to decide whether
possession of a controlled substance must be of a measurable or
usable amount to constitute a violation. The Court noted that
common sense, justice and fairness dictate that the law should not
punish a person found to be in possession of a container in which
only

a

scientist

can

determine

substance.
10

it to

contain

a

controlled

The Arkansas Court traced the history of decisions which
require either a usable amount of a substance or an amount
sufficient to permit the person in possession to know of its
presence. It cites with approval the Texas cases Greer v. State 163
Tex Crim. R.377, 292 SW 2.d 122 (1956) and Pellam v. State 164 Tex
Crim Rpt. 226 298 SW 2.d 171 (1957).

The Texas Courts described

the amounts involved as "infinitesimal" and said "It would be a
harsh rule indeed that would charge the Appellant with knowingly
possession that which it required a microscope to identify".
The California Supreme Court has interpreted its possession
statute to require a "knowing" possession in the sense.

The

accused must have knowledge of the presence of the object, although
it is not necessary

that she or he have knowledge

of

its

"character". The leading California case is People v. Leal 64 Cal.
2d. 504, 50 Cal. Rpt. 777 413 P2.d

665

(1966).

"It is not

scientific measurement and detection which is the ultimate test of
the known possession of a narcotic, but rather the awareness of the
defendant of the presence of the narcotic".
The Court noted that the presence of residue or a trace
amount of a forbidden drug poses less danger of future harm and is
less probative of the intent to using a narcotic in the future,
than the presence of drug paraphernalia which the legislature has
made a misdemeanor.

The intent of the legislature was to condemn

the "commodity" which could be used as such.

It did not refer to

[useless] traces or residue of such substance.
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that to constitute the
offense of possession a "usable" amount must be found State v.
Moreno 92 Ariz 116 374 P 2.d 872 (1962). The District of Columbia,
11

Court of Appeals in Edelin v. United States 227 A 2.d 395 (D.C.
1967) reached a similar decision based on arguments that possession
of an unusable amount of a prohibited drug was not what Congress
meant to criminalize because it could neither be used nor sold.
The Court stated "if this substance cannot be sold, if it cannot
be administered or dispensed, common sense dictates that it is not
such a narcotic as contemplated by congress to be a danger to
society, the possession of which is proscribed".
These cases were followed in

Singly v. United States, 533

A 2.d 245 (D.C. 1987) and by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. One Gates Lear Jet, 861
F 2.d 868 (Fifth Circuit 1988).

In Singley, the chemical analysis

of the 70 milligrams of white powder indicated that it contained
only a "small amount" of heroin. The Court stated that a conviction
for possession cannot be sustained "where there is only a trace of
a substance, a chemical constituent not quantitatively determined
because of minuteness, and there is no additional proof of its
usability as a narcotic." (at p. 247) The prosecutor conceded that
the government was not able to prove whether this heroin is in a
concentration that would have a discernable narcotic effect.

The

Court noted that the government can readily meet its burden of
proof either by performing more sensitive or precise tests or by
adopting a uniform terminology that is keyed to the usability of
a particular substance.
In U.S. vs. One Gates Learjet Serial No. 28004 (5th Cir. ,
(1988),

the

government

sought

to

forfeit

the

airplane

for

transporting cocaine, based upon the vacuuming of the plane and the
chemists report of finding of a trace of cocaine in the vacuumed
12

dust. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that
the amount in question was to small to be possessed, used,
exchanged, or enhanced. It cited with approval cases which consider
small amounts of controlled substances insufficient to support a
claimed violation of the narcotics laws.

It also noted that the

government cited several decisions establishing the rubric that the
amount

of

the

contraband

found

on

the

conveyance

is

not

controlling.
There are cases cited which have adopted a blind adherence
to statutory language requiring a finding of "any" amount of a drug
or an "identifiable" amount.

However, the Utah statute does not

contain either of those words in its operative phrase. See also 77
Col L. Rev. 596 (1977).
The point then becomes whether the rationale is that the
amount of controlled substance is either (1) sufficient to permit
knowledge

of

its

presence

without

the

need

for

scientific

identification or (2), to be sufficient to be usable in the amount
in which a substance if ordinarily used.

The intent of the

legislation prohibiting possession of a controlled substance is to
prevent use of and control use of those substances. Possession of
a trace amount or residue which cannot be used and which the
accused may not even know is on his person, or within his control
contributes to neither evil. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded
that possession of less than a useable amount of a controlled
substance

is

not

what

Legislators

have

in

mind

when

they

criminalized possession because it cannot contribute to future
conduct at which the legislation is aimed, that is, use of or
trafficking in drugs.
13

The Supreme Court of California in People v. Leal 413 P 2.d
665 (1966) discussed the policy considerations in considerable
detail. The decision traces evolution of the California law which
requires a usable amount test in order to establish the crime of
possession and cites with approval the California Supreme Court in
People v. Sullivanf 1965 234 Cal App 2.d 562 44 Cal Rpt 524 as
follows:
"the criminal law is engaged in a
continuous process of drawing lines
and in the enforcement of offenses
involving narcotics, fixed lines
appear to be unavoidable. To this
end we believe the legislature has
established helpful guidelines in
distinguishing
the
crimes
of
possession
of
narcotics
paraphernalia and being under the
influence
of
narcotics,
both
misdemeanors, from the more serious
crime of possessing the narcotic
itself, a felony", the
Court further stated "we conclude
the
possession
of
a
minute
crystalize residue of [narcotic] not
intended for consumption or sale and
useless for either of these purposes
is insufficient evidence to sustain
a conviction for known possession of
a narcotic".
At page 670 the Court pointed out that the statutory scheme
is part of an extensive body of narcotics control legislation and
that the legislature has established many categories of offenses
to which it has annexed punishments which vary widely in degree.
The Court stated that in an effort to preserve a separate and
independent place in the Statutory plan and one which harmonizes
with other parts of the plan, that it could not overlook the fact
that the possession of minute traces of narcotics residue poses
less danger of future harm and is less probative of an intent to
14

use narcotics in the future, than the possession of narcotics
implements, an offense which the legislature has denominated a
misdemeanor.
The Court further stated "the most compelling explanation
for the vast disparity between punishments next to sections 11500
and 11555, is that Section 11500 applies to those who by their
possession of narcotic substances have created a potentiality for
future use or sale. Whether a Defendant who possesses only minute
traces of narcotics residue creates such a potentiality is purely
a question of fact which the prosecution must prove.
The

Court

further

concluded

that

the

statutory

differentiation of the various crimes as well as the history of
the cases show that in penalizing a person who possesses a
narcotic, the legislature proscribed the possession of a substance
that has a narcotic potential and condemned the commodity could be
used as such.

It did not refer to useless traces or residue of

such substance.

Hence, the possession of a minute crystalize

residue of a narcotic useless for either sale or consumption, does
not

constitute

sufficient

evidence

in

itself

to

sustain

a

conviction. See also People v. McCarthy 413 P2.d 671).
The Supreme Court of California in People v. Fein 484 P 2.d
583 reaffirmed the line of cases including People v. Leal (supra).
The Court stated at page 588 "It is now well established that
evidence of useless traces or residue of narcotic substances do
not constitute sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for
possession of narcotics".
accept

evidence

of

The Court further stated " were we to

recent

past

possession

of

narcotics

as

equivalent to proof of present possession of narcotics, then when
15

we could charge every addict who was currently hot with possession
of a narcotic since he must have had possession of the narcotic in
the recent past in order to come under its influence."
In State v. Moreno 92 Ariz 116 374 P 2.d 872 the Supreme
Court of Arizona held that the correct rule to be applied under
the Arizona Statute is that, where the amount of a narcotic is so
small as to require a chemical analysis to detect its presence,
the quantity is sufficient if usable under the known practices of
narcotics addicts.

The court held that only in those cases where

the amount is incapable of being put to any effective use will the
evidence be insufficient to support a conviction (at page 875).
The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Theel, 505 P 2.d 964
(1973) reversed a conviction for unlawful possession of marijuana,
where traces and unusable amounts of narcotics were found in the
possession of an accused.

The Court observed "where the quantity

involved is so minute that it amounts to only a trace, there is no
basis from the fact alone for any logical or reasonable inference
that the Defendant had knowledgeable possession", citing with
approval State v. Dempsey

22 Ohio State 219 259 N.E. 2.d 745, 748

(1970).
The amount of methamphetamine allegedly found on Defendant's
person

may

be

consistent

paraphernalia, but is wholly
reasonable

doubt

knowing

with

the

possession

insufficient

and

intentional

of

drug

to prove beyond a
possession.

The

Defendant testified that he, at some point, had been aware that he
had the mirror, the tube and the small vial.

And although it had

contained methamphetamine one time, he thought that the drug had
been used up at some remote point in time in the past.
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The

chemist, although able to identify a discernable amount of white
powder in the bottom of the vial, was unable to testify with any
certainty that the compound would have any effect on a human
being, nor have any commercial value.

The State failed to prove

a usable amount or the fact that the defendant "knowingly and
intentionally possessed it.
Defendant

submits

that

the

line

of

cases

decided

in

California, Arizona, Colorado, Washington D.C., Arkansas, Ohio,
and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for the United States are
the better reasoned decisions. To hold otherwise would be to blur
the distinction between a "residue case" and a "possession case".
If

the

"no

particular

quantity"

argument

is

followed

literally, any paraphernalia case based on allegations of residue,
traces, or small amounts also would not only support that but
would also support a possession case as well.

In light of the

considerable disparity in penalties it would seem unreasonable to
presume that the legislature intended to those punishments for
possession of minute

or trace amounts of any illegal drug.

In U.S. vs. Property at 2323 Charms Rd., Milford Tp., 726 F.
Supp. 164 (E.D. Mich. 1989), the Court cited U.S. vs. One Gates
Learjet, supra, with approval.

That Court further stated, in

denying the government's complaint for forfeiture of an aircraft:
The government's enthusiasm for the use of the
forfeiture power to increase the risk of
engaging in drug trafficking should not blind
it to considerations of fairness in dealing
with its constituents. In this regard, the
Court is reminded of Justice Brandeis'
dissenting words in Olmstead v. United Statesf
227 U.S. 438, 479, 48 S.Ct. 564, 572-73, 72 L.
Ed. 944 (1928):
Experience should teach us to be most on
our guard to protect liberty when the
17

Governments purposes are beneficent.
Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel
invasion of their liberty be evil-minded
rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding.
It is a well established principle of criminal responsibility
that a citizen be adequately informed by the government of the
consequences of his conduct.

The present existing interpretation

of the law creates a snare for the unwary, leads to selective
prosecutions and occasions far harsher punishments than the actual
nature of the conduct warrants.

POINT TWO
THE SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION
AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The scope of cruel and unusual punishment clause extends not
only to barbarous methods of punishment, but also to punishments
that

grossly

disproportionate.

Disproportionality

analysis

measures the relationship between the nature and number of offenses
committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted upon the
offender.

See Rummel v. Estel 445 US 263 63 L.Ed 2.d 382 100 Sc

1133 (1980)(and cases cited therein).

See also Solem v. Helm 463

US 277 77 L.Ed 2.d 637 100 Sc 3001. Weems v. United States 21 US
349 54 L.Ed 793 30 Sc 544 (1910).
A punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if it (1) makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and
hence is nothing more than a purposeless and needless imposition
of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime.

A sentence may be excessive if it serves
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no acceptable social purpose or is grossly disproportionate to the
seriousness of the crime.
In the instant case, Jensen had no prior felony convictions,
and had no prior drug related convictions, although he had a
history of problems with the abuse of alcohol. The Court conducted
a Sentencing Hearing in which evidence was adduced on the behalf
of the Defendant. The Defendant admitted that he had problems with
drugs and alcohol in the past but was desirous of entering into a
treatment facility. His grandparents in Idaho volunteered to offer
him a free place to live, and promised to supervise him closely.
He had an uncle in the area who assured him a job where he could
learn a useful trade.

A drug and alcohol counselor who had

formerly supervised Jensen wrote the Court and pointed out the
availability of various mental health and anti-drug programs in the
immediate area.(R. 180-223).
The case in favor of incarceration was primarily based upon
the use of the matrixes and definitions of his prior record.
Defendant submits for purposes of this appeal that the analysis
conducted by the Adult Parole and Probation Department was flawed
and erroneous. Therefore, he argues that he received a much harsher
sentence than would be warranted by the objective facts of his
background and criminal history.
Defendant submits that it is cruel and unusual punishment in
contravention of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution to impose
a 5 year prison sentence for an offense involving an unusable and
valueless amount of methamphetamine.

The particular chemical in

question in the instant case is a commonly prescribed medicinal
compound which has been on the market in various forms for many,
19

many years.

Amphetamines have been made available through the

pharmaceutical distribution system, as well as by unauthorized
laboratories.

In many countries amphetamines are routinely sold

in drugstores without prescription.
In light of the prevalence of methamphetamine in both legal
and

illegal

forms,

Defendant

submits

that

public

policy

considerations should not encourage creating felons out of ordinary
citizens who inadvertently may be found in possession of trace or
minute or insubstantial quantities of this particular substance.
In the instant case, where the amount involved was so small that
no determination that it would be useful could be made, would seem
to be an appropriate case to decide that 5 years imprisonment for
an amount of amphetamine that has no useful value, either as a drug
or for resale is an abuse of the Eighth Amendment and the cruel and
unusual punishments clause.
It may be anticipated that it may be argued that the evils
allegedly associated with drugs in our society would justify a
ruling that any amount of a controlled substance however small,
which is capable of scientific detection through sensitive testing
equipment would be sufficient to constitute a felony offense. The
proponents of a harsh attack on users of pharmaceutical compounds
often fail to take into account the substantial personal and social
costs incurred by both society and the individual.

According to

recent news accounts, it will cost upwards of $25,000 per year to
incarcerate Mr. Jensen.

If he serves his entire term this could

be an amount of $100,000 to $125,000.
Further, Mr. Jensen is of course taken out of the workforce
where, it may be presumed, he had earning capacities of $12,000 to
20

$15,000 per year. Thus, an additional $60,000 of lost earnings to
Mr. Jensen personally will result. Economists commonly accept an
economic multiplier effect that approximately five times the amount
spent by a consumer will result to the general economy.
loss of earnings will result in
economy.

Thus, the

approximate $300,000 loss to the

Of course, this analysis does not take into account the

basic overhead of the Court system, including police, prosecutors,
and associated staff workers,
Further, the branding of Mr. Jensen as a "felon" will serve
to dibble him permanently from accepting numerous occupations for
which he may otherwise be qualified
voting, and

It will prevent him from

will prevent him from serving in the Armed Forces of

the United States. The long term consequences are subsfrani"'jal for
a person so labeled. (At the common law there were no repeat
felons, since it was, by definition, a hanging offense,}
A better public policy would be to deal with people who have
medical problems through the health care system.

The fallout of

the drug war has made little difference in the amount of usage of
chemical substances by the general public, but has resulted in the
wholesale incarceration of enormous numbers of individuals, many
of whom are simply casual users. The diversion of scarce financial
resources into the prosecution, police and imprisonment systems
results in schools, hospitals and clinics being left without
sufficient resources to educate the public with respect to the
proper use of medicinal compounds or to effectively treat those
individuals who have had the misfortune to become dependent upon
chemical substances.
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The current state of the drug enforcement most resembles the
experiment

this

country

entered

into

during

attempting to ban all alcoholic beverages-

prohibition

by

The rest of the world

continued to produce spirits, wines and beer and the general public
was unwilling to comply with a statute which was simply not
believed in by many Individuals.

However,

by making a commonly

available substance an illegal item, a black market W?IK rr^at^d r
The istctLul<eb> Uiu^5 perversely encourage the consumption of alcohol
by creating an economic incentive for the produc*/Ion - ^ l e , and
distribution through other than normal commercial channels.
Similarly, the existence of a blackmarket whirh operates
no.mTi.irrpntiv with the public health care system has created other
problems. Drug cases have now come to constitute over half of th^
criminal case load in most courthouses in this nation,,

As a

consequence, legitimate civil 1 awfiu •»•"*•? p »^ny of which have profound
public policy consequences, do not reach trial for a protracted
period of time, sometimes years. The imposition of ha^h and
lengthy prison ^enf-enoe^ has; resulted in prisons operating at 100%
to

150% of

designed

capacity.

Further

incarceration

and

warehousing of nth^-rianse productive citizens who are all amenable
to therapeutic treatment and health carp -inLervent Ion is no longer
cost effective.
The Governor recently opposed a plan to repeal a sales tax
on food on t.h*^ \ heory that the 80 or 90 million dollars required
would come directly out of the pocket of education. The new budget
includes requosts that would require an additional 80 or 90 million
dollars, not for education, but to fund additional prisons.
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It would be a better public policy to divert individuals from
the criminal system into the health care system where their only
offense is some casual involvement with rue U S R of phariuacwivi.'»n«l
compounds*

Five (5) year?,

paraphernalia,

which

imprisonment for the possession of

f

normally

is a maximum

of

six months, is

p^PKfiivft and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
CONCLUSION
Tn conclusion, th^ rv»Pendant requests that this Court decide
that the amount of amphetamine in the sample sei ?ed f or** rh
v j. r\ !.

rYrnit/n

i r->

felony offense of possession of a controlled subrt-^o-ali^m^riv^

In the

the D.viVnda^t requests that the matter be remanded

for a new trial*
Respectfully submitted.
DATED this

day of December, .1990.
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